Remote data checking (RDC) is a scheme that allows clients to efficiently check the integrity of data stored at an untrusted server using spot-checking. Efforts have been consistently devoted toward improving the efficiency of such RDC schemes because they involve some overhead. In this letter, it is assumed that a probabilistic attack model is adopted, in which an adversary corrupts exposed blocks in the network with a certain probability. An optimal spot-checking ratio that simultaneously guarantees the robustness of the scheme and minimizes the overhead is obtained.
Introduction
Remote storage provided by a storage service provider (SSP) allows clients to store large amounts of data at affordable prices. Because clients might store private data that is not supposed to be revealed to others, the data stored at the server should be securely maintained. However, clients may not fully trust SSPs. Therefore, the importance of an auditing scheme for remote storage servers has been emphasized.
Under these circumstances, the provable data possession (PDP) scheme has been proposed [1] , [2] . This scheme is capable of checking the integrity of data without downloading the original data from the perspective of the client and without retrieving the entire data from the perspective of the server. These requirements can be fulfilled by adopting spot-checking [3] . In spot-checking, the integrity of data is checked by randomly sampling a set of blocks rather than accessing the entire data set. Although spot-checking is suitable for detecting large corruptions, it is vulnerable to small corruptions against the entire data size. This problem has been resolved by introducing the notion of δ-robustness, which adopts forward error correction (FEC) codes such as the Reed-Solomon (RS) code [4] - [6] (δ-robustness will be defined in Sect. 2.1.)
Although many studies have investigated the efficiency of PDP schemes, some overhead is still incurred during spot-checking. For example, the auditing scheme introduced in [5] has a drawback in that even though a client requests for a download of only a small part of the data, whole parity blocks are redundantly downloaded together with the requested data in order to conceal the association between the data blocks and the parity blocks.
To overcome this problem, Dong et al. proposed a scheme that efficiently ensures δ-robustness by minimizing the parity redundancy in the downloaded data [7] . Although this scheme provides an optimal value for the number of parity blocks to be downloaded during one spot-check, it cannot suggest an optimal value for the number of spot-checked blocks to efficiently ensure δ-robustness for a file stored at a server.
According to the PDP scheme, if the number of spotchecked blocks is sufficient compared to the number of total blocks in a file, the δ-robustness of the file is ensured. However, if spot-checking is performed for too many blocks, the large number of samplings will lead to excessive overhead. On the other hand, if the number of spot-checked blocks is too small, δ-robustness cannot be ensured. In this sense, the present study aims to propose a technique for selecting the optimal number of spot-checked blocks that minimizes the overhead and ensures δ-robustness simultaneously.
System Model

Robust RDC Scheme
In the PDP scheme [4] , a file F is represented as a finite ordered collection of f blocks: F = b 1 , . . . , b f . To store F in the server, a client must transform F into an encoded F. An encoding algorithm such as [3] , [4] and [5] divides F into k-block chunks. Then the (n,k) RS code is applied to each chunk which is called a constraint group. The redundancy (d) and error correcting capacity (t) for each constraint group are computed as d = n − k and t = d/2 respectively [6] .
A file F is encoded intoF :
In the fileF, k data blocks are constrained by d check blocks. The check blocks contain error correcting codes as redundancy information for data recovery. Next, it permutes the check blocks to hide the structure of the file. The output of the permutation is represented as R : r 1 , . . . , r f k d which is an ordered collection of After encoding, the client sendsF to the server and stores metadata in its local storage. The server receivesF and saves it in the server-side storage. After that, the server computes a proof of data possession and sends it back to the client. Finally, the client checks validity of the proof.
In the challenge phase, an auditor (or client) generates some challenge block's index which is a collection of randomly sampled c blocks i 1 , . . . , i c where 1 ≤ c ≤f and requests a proof of possession for the challenged blocks b i 1 , . . . , b i c to the server. In this sampling scheme named as spot-checking [4] , the value c/f is referred to as spotchecking ratio. The server sends the proof of the challenged blocks to the auditor. Then the auditor checks the validity of the proof.
If an adversary corrupts xF blocks amongf blocks, the probability that an auditor can detect the corruption, denoted as P(detectF), can be computed as shown in Eq. (1) [4] . The detection is considered as successful in case the auditor finds one or more corrupted blocks through the spot-checking. Equation (1) depends on the number of challenged blocks c and corrupted block ratio xF/f .
Adversarial model. Since the SSP's server is not fully trusted, an adversary dominating the server may try to cheat the auditor. For example, the adversary can corrupt part of stored data in the server after the server sends a proof to the auditor. If part of data is corrupted, the auditor can detect the corrupted blocks by the spot-checking at the next challenge phase. Since the challenging uses a sampling scheme, the auditor might fail to detect very small part of corruption.
Since the small size corruption can be recovered by the RS code, the adversary must destroy data of which size is large enough not to be recovered by the RS code. But the size should be small not to be detected by the spot-checking. In this situation, an RDC scheme must ensure δ-robustness to protect the adversary's attack and securely store the client's data. The δ-robustness is defined as follows [4] Definition 1: When an original file F is encoded asF and stored at a server, an RDC scheme provides δ-robustness when i) the auditor will detect corruption with high probability (more than 1 − ) if an adversary corrupts more than a δ-fraction ofF; or ii) the auditor will recover the data in F with high probability (more than 1 − ) if an adversary corrupts at most a δ-fraction ofF.
Definition 1 states that δ-robustness requires that the probability of failure to detect the data corruption by the spot-checking, i.e., 1 − P(detectF) or the probability of failure to recover the file by the RS code, i.e., 1 − P(recoverF) should be less than . Therefore, must be a very small value. For example, was set to 10 −10 in [4] , [5] , and [7] .
Probabilistic Attack Model
If part of a file is corrupted, the probability that an auditor detects the corruption increases as the portion of corrupted data grows. Contrarily the probability that the file is recovered using the RS codes increases as the portion of corrupted data lessens. As a consequence, an adversary who is eager to achieve his/her malicious objective needs to determine a suitable ratio of corruption preventing detection by the spotchecking and recovery by the RS codes simultaneously. The πR scheme [4] disallows an adversary to identify that some blocks are original data F or redundancy information R. Therefore, the adversary is forced to corrupt only part of encoded file blocks randomly and such a behavior can be explained by a probabilistic attack model. Under this model, we assume that an adversary corrupts each block with a certain probability β which is large enough and small enough. The adversary's attack is considered as successful if the auditor fails to detect and recover the file corruption in the challenge phase. Example 1 There is a fileF which hasf block at a server encoded by a (140, 130) RS code. The size of the encoded fileF is 4TB where a block size is 4KB. While a client was challenging c blocks off blocks, the file was exposed to a probabilistic attack attempted by an adversary. In the challenge phase, if an auditor extracts 4% of the file for spotchecking, the error detection probability and recovery probability according to the corruption probability can be presented as graphs, as shown in Fig. 1 .
The blue solid line and red solid line denote the error detection probability and error recovery probability, respectively (The calculation of these probabilities will be explained in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2). In Fig. 1 , either the error detection probability or the error recovery probability is greater than or equal to the threshold 1− in the entire range of β. Thus, δ-robustness is guaranteed. Figure 2 plots the error detection probability versus the error recovery probability when all the conditions are the same as in Fig. 1 except that the percentage of sampled data for spot-checking decreases to 2%. Figure 2 indicates that there exists a range of β where both the error detection probability and the error recovery probability are lower than 1− . Thus, δ-robustness is not guaranteed in this range. In Figs. 1  and 2 , the error recovery probability is predetermined at the time of RS encoding because it only depends on the RS encoding parameters n and t as shown in Eqs. (11) and (12), whereas the error detection probability varies with the spotchecking ratio, c/f . Hence, we can achieve δ-robustness by adjusting the spot-checking ratio appropriately.
Assume that a block in the fileF is corrupted by a constant probability β and the events where each block is corrupted are mutually independent. Then, the event that xF blocks among the c spot-checked blocks are corrupted follows the binomial distribution B(c,β). When c becomes sufficiently large, the binomial distribution can be mapped to a normal distribution N(cβ, cβ(1 − β) ). In the normal distribution, P(xF
, the probabilities that xF is m times the standard deviation away from the mean are calculated for some m as shown in 
Proposed Approach
Minimum Threshold to Detect Errors
According to Definition 1, to guarantee δ-robustness from the perspective of error detection, the probability that the adversary successfully performs an attack, denoted as 1 − P(detectF), should be less than . It can be written as Eq. (2).
Equation (1) can be transformed into Eq. (3).
Since xF/f means the ratio of the damaged blocks to the whole file blocks, it is expressed as DamageF.
By combining Eqs. (2) and (4),
If we rewrite Eq. (5) for DamageF,
Equations (2)∼(6) state that the ratio of damaged blocks should be larger than or equal to 1 − 1 c in order to detect adversary's attacks with a probability of 1 − or higher. Therefore, the minimum damaged block ratio necessary for detecting data corruption, Damage detect−min , can be expressed as
If we multiply Eq. (7) byf , we can obtain a threshold T h detect that represents the minimum number of damaged blocks (i.e., the minimum value of xF). We can express this threshold as
As mentioned in Sect. 2.2, the distribution of xF is a normal distribution N(cβ, cβ(1 − β)) for a large c. In this distribution, spot-checking will be failed if xF is less than
T h detect . If we set T h detect to be E[xF] − mσ[xF], the probability that the spot-checking will fail to detect the damaged blocks becomes P(xF < E[xF] − mσ[xF]).
Since the probability of failure must satisfy Eq. (2), we can express this relationship by Eq. (9).
P(xF ≤ E[xF] − mσ[xF]) ≤
Equation (9) indicates that is affected by E[xF] − mσ[xF].
If we set m to 6, will be 9.8660×10 −10 as shown in Table 1 . This value is greater than of [4] , [5] , and [7] . However, if we set m to 7, will be 1.2971×10 −12 . Notice that this value is smaller than of [4] , [5] , and [7] ; hence, our proposed method guarantees δ-robustness of which level is stronger than [4] , [5] , and [7] . Equation (10) represents the minimum threshold value of xF when m = 7.
Let the solution of Eq. (10) be β detect . If β is less than β detect , an auditor cannot detect the corruption with high probability 1 − . In this case, the δ−robustness is not ensured from the perspective of error detection.
Given the parameters off , c, and , we can obtain the value of β detect by computing T h detect in Eq. (8) and substituting it into Eq. (10). (1 − β) ). Note that T h detect is obtained from Eq. (8).
Maximum Threshold to Recover Errors
As explained in Sect. 2.1, a single constraint group that is encoded by an (n,k) RS code consists of n blocks and its error recovery capacity is t(t = d/2). Let c blocks amongf blocks in a file be exposed to probabilistic attacks after the challenge phase. Further let recoverF denote the event that all these blocks are recovered by the RS codes and recover i denote the event that the i-th constraint group is recovered. The number of constraint groups of the exposed blocks, g, can be written as c/n . The (n, k) RS coding can recover the constraint group as long as up to t blocks among n blocks in one constraint group are damaged. Therefore, the probability of a successful recovery of the i-th constraint group can be written as
where the attack probability is β and n l denotes the binomial coefficient which represents a combination of l objects from n objects. If the events recover i for 1 ≤ i ≤ g are independent, the probability of success to recover the attacked file can be written as
To guarantee δ-robustness from the perspective of error recovery, the probability that the adversary successfully performs an attack, denoted as 1 − P(recoverF), should be less than . This can be expressed as
In Eq. (12), P(recoverF) decreases as β increases. Therefore, Eq. (13) does not hold if β increases above a certain value. In the range below a certain value of β, Eq. (13) is satisfied and δ-robustness is thus guaranteed. This value of β is denoted as β recover . It is the maximum value of β that guarantees δ-robustness. It can be calculated by
Now, we can define another threshold T h recover , the maximum number of damaged blocks (i.e., the maximum value of xF) such that the file is recovered with a probability of 1 − or greater. As with Eq. (10), if we make E[xF] + mσ [xF] equal to T h recover , the probability that the (n,k) RS coding fails to recover the fileF becomes P(xF ≥
E[xF] + mσ[xF]). It can be written as
T h recover = E[xF] + mσ[xF]
= cβ recover + 7 cβ recover (1 − β recover )
If β > β recover , an auditor cannot recover the corruption with high probability 1 − , and the δ−robustness is not ensured from the perspective of error recovery. Given the parameters of n, t, c and , we can calculate β recover from 12) on varying β at the same condition of n, t and c as above. Figures 3 and 4 show the probabilities related to T h detect and T h recover on a horizontal line.
Interval to Ensure δ-robustness
On the left-hand side of T h detect in Fig. 3 , δ-robustness cannot be guaranteed because the error detection probability is lower than the threshold. On the right-hand side of T h recover in Fig. 4 , δ-robustness cannot be guaranteed because the error recovery probability is lower than the threshold. When we combine the two figures on a single horizontal line, T h detect < T h recover should hold for guaranteeing δ-robustness for any β. Equation (8) indicates that T h detect (hence, β detect by Eq. (10)) is significantly affected by c, whereas Eq. (14) indicates that β recover (hence, T h recover by Eq. (15)) is significantly affected by t and g (hence, c be-
However, T h recover < T h detect may hold if we choose a small c † for spot-checking or use a low value of t for file encoding. In this case, δ-robustness cannot be guaranteed because both the error detection probability and the error recovery probability are lower than the threshold, as seen in Fig. 2 . This might allow an adversary to have a chance to attack without being detected and also prevent recovery simultaneously.
Analysis
In order to identify the conditions under which δ-robustness is guaranteed, it is necessary to consider the parameters c/f , n, t, and , which might influence T h detect and T h recover . Note that was already set to P(xF > E[xF] + 7σ[xF]) = 1.2971 × † Hereinafter we will use c/f instead of c because c varies with file size. 10 −12 in Sect. 2, and n was also fixed at the time of encoding files. Consequently, T h detect and T h recover are determined by the remaining two parameters, c/f and t. Table 2 lists the values of T h detect and T h recover with varying c/f and t while n is set to 140 and is set to 1.2971 × 10 −12 for a 4TB file. Among the values in Table 2 , the bold-type values represent the cases in which T h recover is less than T h detect . In these cases, δ-robustness is not guaranteed, as seen in Fig. 2 . By contrast, the values in regular font represent the cases in which T h recover is larger than T h detect , i.e., the cases in which δ-robustness is guaranteed, as seen in Fig. 1 . Table 2 shows that δ-robustness might be guaranteed or not depending on c/f in spite of the same t value. For example, δ-robustness is guaranteed when t is 5 and spotchecking is performed using 3% extraction, whereas δ-robustness is not guaranteed when c/f is as low as 2%. As c/f decreases from 3% to 2%, 1/c increases and T h detect in Eq. (8) also increases. Then, T h detect switches sides with respect to T h recover in Fig. 1 , as shown in Fig. 2 . Now, we can define the cross point of T h detect and T h recover . In order to determine this cross point, we need to identify a suitable c for satisfying both Eqs. (16) and (17).
If we find the c value satisfying Eq. (17) in the case of t = 5 and then calculate c/f , the cross point appears around 2.90%. This implies that δ-robustness can be guaranteed if we set c/f to 2.9% or higher. This finding demonstrates that the 10% ratio taken in [4] and [7] is a sufficiently high spot-checking ratio to guarantee δ-robustness. According to Table 2 , we ensure that for each t value, a minimum value of c exists such that δ-robustness is guaranteed. Because t is usually predetermined at the time of encoding, we can control only c after a file is loaded at a server. In this study, we denote this minimum value as c min .
In summary, the case of T h detect < T h recover leads to inefficiency because c > c min , whereas when T h recover < T h detect , δ-robustness is not ensured because c < c min . Therefore, c min /f is the best spot-checking ratio in the range where δ-robustness is ensured.
Conclusion
We proposed a mechanism for determining the optimal spotchecking ratio by applying a probabilistic attack model to existing RDC schemes. During this process, we defined the probabilities β detect and β recover that are necessary for guaranteeing δ-robustness in terms of error detection and error recovery depending on the user's circumstances. We also described the steps for calculating the thresholds T h detect and T h recover , which are related to β detect and β recover . Based on the analysis of these thresholds, we described the steps for calculating c min /f , i.e., the minimum spot-checking ratio. Thus, c min /f can be considered as the core parameter in this study. It is expected that this core parameter will minimize the spot-checking overhead, thereby providing an opportunity to efficiently use the limited resources in cloud systems.
